On selecting the nonce length in distance bounding protocols by Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini et al.
© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Computer Society. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxt033
On Selecting the Nonce Length in
Distance-Bounding Protocols
Aikaterini Mitrokotsa1,2,∗, Pedro Peris-Lopez3, Christos Dimitrakakis1 and
Serge Vaudenay1
1EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
2University of Applied Sciences of Western Switzerland (HES-SO), Geneva, Switzelrand
3Carlos III University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain
∗Corresponding author: mitrokatkm@gmail.com
Distance-bounding protocols form a family of challenge–response authentication protocols that have
been introduced to thwart relay attacks. They enable a verifier to authenticate and to establish an
upper bound on the physical distance to an untrusted prover. We provide a detailed security analysis
of a family of such protocols. More precisely, we show that the secret key shared between the verifier
and the prover can be leaked after a number of nonce repetitions. The leakage probability, while
exponentially decreasing with the nonce length, is only weakly dependent on the key length. Our
main contribution is a high probability bound on the number of sessions required for the attacker to
discover the secret, and an experimental analysis of the attack under noisy conditions. Both of these
show that the attack’s success probability mainly depends on the length of the used nonces rather
than the length of the shared secret key. The theoretical bound could be used by practitioners to
appropriately select their security parameters. While longer nonces can guard against this type of
attack, we provide a possible countermeasure which successfully combats these attacks even when
short nonces are used.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Relay attacks enable an adversary to act as man-in-the-middle
and fool a legitimate verifier [e.g. radio frequency identification
(RFID) reader] into thinking that he is in close proximity.
Relay attacks can be mainly discriminated into the following
three categories: distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud
attacks [1].
(1) The distance fraud attack involves a malicious prover
Q who is trying to convince a legitimate verifier V of
being nearer to V than he really is.
(2) In the mafia fraud attack, the adversary A is interacting
with a legitimate verifier V and a legitimate prover P .
The goal is to shorten the distance between the legitimate
prover P and the verifier V . The adversary achieves
that by convincing V that he is communicating with the
legitimate prover P while in reality he communicates
with the adversary A.
(3) The terrorist fraud attack involves again an adversary A
interacting with a legitimate verifier V and a legitimate
but dishonest prover P ′. Again the goal is to shorten
the distance between the verifier V and the dishonest
but legitimate prover P ′. Nevertheless, in this case P ′
collaborates with A but without revealing the secret key
shared between V and P ′.
Distance-bounding protocols were first introduced by Brands
and Chaum [2] to preclude distance fraud and mafia fraud
attacks. More precisely, they proposed a mechanism to infer an
upper bound of the distance between the verifier and the prover
by measuring the round trip delay during a rapid challenge–
response bit exchange of n rounds. Around 15 years later,
Hancke and Kuhn [3] proposed a distance-bounding protocol in
the context of RFID technology which may be considered a sem-
inal paper in this research area. Later, Munilla and Peinado [4]
proposed a protocol inspired by Hancke and Kuhn [3] in which
the success probability of an adversary to accomplish a mafia
fraud attack is reduced. However, the feasibility of this scheme is
questionable since it requires three physical states {0, 1, void}.
Singelée and Preneel [5] proposed a distance-bounding
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protocol which uses an error correction code to facilitate the
correction of errors (in noisy channels) during the rapid bit
exchange (RBE) phase. Nevertheless, this scheme’s security
and implementation cost on RFID tags is questioned in [6].
The above-mentioned protocols do not address terrorist
fraud attacks. In 2007, Tu and Piramuthu [7] addressed both
terrorist and mafia fraud attacks and proposed an enhancement
scheme. The authors used ideas previously presented in [8]
to prevent terrorist attacks. Kapoor et al. [9] have extended
Tu’s and Piramuthu’s protocol to the case where multiple tags
are authenticated for their simultaneous presence in the field of
an RFID reader. Nevertheless, Kim et al. [10] noted that Tu’s
and Piramuthu’s protocol is vulnerable to a simple active attack
and proposed a new protocol called Swiss-Knife, attempting
to correct the vulnerabilities of all its predecessors. All these
protocols [7–10] use the same method to generate the responses
that are later used in the RBE phase. Further distance-bounding
protocols [11–13] have been proposed and many attacks against
them have been published [14–17].
Our contribution: In this paper,1 we perform a security
analysis in a family including the above distance-bounding
protocols [7–10]. The way these generate the responses during
the RBE phase enables us to recover the shared secret after
a number of random nonce repetitions logarithmic in the key
length. The complexity of the attack depends mainly on the
length of the random nonces used. We provide a detailed
theoretical and experimental analysis on the number of sessions
required to achieve full disclosure of the key. More precisely,
we prove that, with high probability, the success of the attack
mainly depends on the length of the nonces and the number
of protocol executions (eavesdropped sessions) rather than the
length of the key. In addition, we experimentally investigate
the success rate of the attack under noisy conditions. The main
utility of our results would be to practitioners. Our bounds can
be used to select appropriate values for their security parameters
when the aforementioned protocols are used.
We should note here that, ideally, nonces should never repeat.
However, there exist protocols making use of too short nonces
which do repeat. For instance, WEP uses 24-bit nonces [19, 20]
which are valid for a single packet encryption. These nonces are
typically encrypted (some weak ones are skipped though). So,
repetition of nonces occur at least every 224 packets.
Nevertheless, for typical RFID usage scenarios, there would
not be a sufficient number of sessions for the attack to succeed
with a significant probability. However, having a legitimate
RFID tag at his disposal would allow an attacker to perform
multiple protocol runs and obtain the secret key.
Our analysis shows that this event is a real threat while our
countermeasure could mitigate the use of short nonces. Finally,
we also describe a countermeasure that could be used in order
to overcome this attack even with short nonces. In our analysis,
1Some partial and preliminary results from this paper were previously
published in technical report arXiv:0906.4618 [18].
FIGURE 1. A general view of the distance-bounding protocols
proposed in [7–10].
we are mainly referring to RFID distance-bounding protocols
and so the concepts Verifier/Reader and Tag/Prover are used
interchangeably.
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a general view of the protocols which we investigate,
and which all generate the responses used in the RBE phase in
the same way. Section 3 describes the passive attack that can be
launched against these protocols. Section 4 presents the theoret-
ical analysis of the attack, while Section 5 describes the exper-
imental results we have performed in order to find the required
number of sessions to recover the key both under noisy condi-
tions and if a noise-free channel is used in the RBE phase, when
the attack is performed against the Swiss-Knife protocol. Finally,
Section 6 describes the possible countermeasure that could be
used to combat this attack, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ANALYSED
DISTANCE-BOUNDING PROTOCOLS
In this section, we describe a family of protocols [7–10] that
use the same technique to generate the responses used in the
RBE phase. Figure 1 depicts a general view of this family of
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TABLE 1. Notation.
d The size of nonce space (so log2 d is the nonce bit length)
n Number of rounds in the RBE phase
x The secret key shared between the verifier and the prover
a The session key
k The bit length of the secret key x
V The verifier
P The prover
NV The random nonce generated by the verifier
NP The random nonce generated by the prover
fx A one-way, collision resistant, pseudorandom
keyed function (using key x)
RBE The RBE phase
ci The ith challenge sent by the verifier in RBE
c′i The ith challenge received by the prover in RBE
ri The ith response sent by the prover in RBE
r ′i The ith response received by the verifier in RBE
$←− Denotes sampling uniformly at random
ti The time difference in the ith round
Tmax Maximum allowed time difference
|m| The bit length of variable m
protocols, while Table 1 depicts the notation used in the rest of
the paper.
Assume that the prover P and the verifier V share a secret
key x. Firstly, the initialization phase, which is not time
critical, is executed. The verifier V chooses a random number
NV and transmits it to the prover P . On receiving it, P
generates a random number NP and computes a session key
a = fx(C,NV, NP), where f denotes a pseudorandom function
(PRF) and C represents any additional parameters such as the
identifiers of the participants and is constant for all instances
of the protocol used in an attack. In this family of protocols,
the output of the PRF f should have the same length as x.
We should note here that the computation of the session key
a varies. More precisely, in the protocols [7–9] a depends on
both random nonces NV and NP while in the Swiss-Knife [10]
protocol it only depends on the random nonce NP.
Then, P splits the secret key into two shares by computing
the following:
Z0 := a,
Z1 := a ⊕ x.
Finally, the prover sends NP to the verifier.
After the initialization phase, the RBE phase starts, which
involves the exchange of challenges–responses at maximum bit
rate. This phase is repeated n times (rounds), with i varying
from 1 to n. The number of rounds n is actually a security
parameter. At each round i the challenge–response delay ti is
measured. V starts by choosing a random bit ci , initializing the
clock to zero and transmitting ci to P . The values received by
P are denoted by c′i .2 Next, P answers by sending ri := Zc
′
i
i .
The values received by V are denoted by r ′i . On receiving r ′i ,
V stops the clock and stores the received answer and the delay
time ti .
After the end of the RBE phase, a final verification phase may
be required.
In the Swiss-Knife protocol, the noise during the distance-
bounding phase is taken under consideration and the need for a
threshold of allowed errors is indicated. A detailed analysis for
the optimal selection of this threshold is provided in [21].
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK
Ideally, nonces should never repeat. However, in practice there
is always a non-zero probability of repetition, which becomes
higher for shorter nonces.This family of protocols is particularly
vulnerable to nonce repetitions, as will be made clear in the
sequel.
In this section, we describe a passive attack that may be
launched against any of the protocols [7–10], whose responses
during the RBE phase are generated in the manner described
in Section 2. The attack can be launched more easily against
the Swiss-Knife [10] protocol because of the way the session
key a is generated in this protocol (i.e. dependence only on the
random nonce NP). Nevertheless, it can also be generalized to
the other three protocols [7–9]. To facilitate the exposition, in
the following we use the variable N to denote the nonces that
are used in the generation of the session key a. More precisely,
it holds that
(1) N = NP for the case where the attack is launched against
the Swiss-Knife [10] protocol;
(2) N = NP||NV for the case where the attack is launched
against any of the other three protocols [7–9].
A successful execution of the attack may lead to the full
disclosure of the shared secret key x. We denote by b the number
of bits that the attacker recovers during the attack out of the total
n bits of the secret key x. The value of b is initialized to zero
(b = 0). The attack is successful as soon as b = n.
To perform the attack, the attacker just needs to eavesdrop
on the public insecure channel used for the communication
between a legitimate prover P and a verifier V during both
phases (i.e. the initialization and the RBE phase) and to follow
these steps:
2The RBE is performed under noisy conditions. If we assume that the
communication between two entities Y and Z is not noise free, then whenever
a symbol m ∈ M is sent from Y to Z, the symbol m′ that Z receives may
differ from m due to noise. This is modelled as a probability of erroneous
transmission from Y to Z, ωYZ = P(m′ = m), ∀m,m′ ∈ M .
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The attacker creates a hash table of vectors (N, {ci, ri}ni=1)
which are keyed by N . For each eavesdropped session:
(1) He captures:
(a) the random nonce N sent either by P or by both P
and V ;
(b) the challenge and response bits {ci, ri}ni=1 transmitted
during the RBE phase.
(2) He inserts (N, {ci, ri}ni=1) in the hash table unless a
collision of N appears.
(3) When a value N appears again, the new values are not
stored but the following action is performed. For i = 1
to n such that xi is unknown so far:{
If ci = c∗i , then xi = ri ⊕ r∗i and b = b + 1,
If ci = c∗i , then xi remains undisclosed,
where ∗ denotes a new session with the same N but a
different stream of challenges and responses.
We should note here that one can normally expect ci
and c∗i to differ with probability
1
2 so that on average
half the remaining unknown bits of x will be revealed.
He stops once all the bits xi have been disclosed, i.e. b = n.
4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK
4.1. Preliminaries
In this theoretical analysis, we only refer to collisions of nonces
N ; these nonces may either be N = NV sent by the verifier or
N = NV‖NP depending on the protocol that is being attacked
(i.e. Swiss-Knife [10] or any of the other three protocols [7–9]
correspondingly). Let N1, . . . , Nt , be a sequence of random
nonces, withNt ∈ N andNt ∼ Unif(N ), where |N | = d < ∞,
t is the total number of sessions, k is the length of the key
and Unif(N ) denotes the uniform distribution over the set N .
We note that, in the family of protocols under investigation,
the length of the key is identical to the number of rounds
(i.e. n = k), since each round uses one bit of the key.
We define the auxiliary variable lt to equal one when we see
a nonce again:
lt 
{
1 if ∃j < t : Nj = Nt,
0 otherwise.
(1)
It is easy to see that lt can be used to count the number of
repetitions:
Lt 
t∑
j=1
lj , (2)
so that Lt equals the number of times elements of N are seen
more than once. Thus, Lt denotes the number of repetitions in
the first t sessions.
For the th repetition, with  ≤ Lt we use c for the challenge
string in the first session involved in the collision and c∗ for the
challenge in the last such session. We denote by ci and c∗i the
ith3 bit of the challenges sent during the first and last sessions
involved in the collision, respectively.
We set i = ci ⊕ c∗i . Since we only count repetitions of
nonces, the following assumption can be made.
Assumption 1. ∃q > 0 such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, y ∈
N,  ≤ y, it holds that
P(i = 0 | Lt = y) = q, (3)
meaning that the events {i = 0} are independent of i, , t
and y.
4.2. High probability bound for the attack
The following theorem shows that, with high probability, the
attacker will not discover the secret key after t sessions. The
bound depends mainly on the number of nonces d, and only
very weakly on the length of the secret key k. Thus, practitioners
should be able to use this bound to select an appropriate length
for the nonce.
Theorem 4.1. Given Assumption 1 for some q ∈ [0, 1], when
d ∈ N is the number of possible nonces, we can recover a key
of length k, with probability at least 1 − δ, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] after at
most t sessions:
t = O
(
max
{√
d log1/q
(
2kq
δ(1 − q)
)
, d2/3(ln(2/δ))1/3
})
.
(4)
Proof. We define Py to be the probability of finding the key
after Lt = y collisions. This is defined by
Py  P(∀i, ∃ ≤ Lt : i = 1 | Lt = y). (5)
The probability of finding the ith bit of the key is
Py,i = P(∃ ≤ Lt : i = 1 | Lt = y). (6)
Finally, the probability of not finding the ith bit of the key is
given by
Qy,i = 1 − Py,i = 1 − P(∃ ≤ Lt : i, = 1 | y = Lt)
= P(∀ ≤ Lt,i = 0 | y = Lt) = qy, (7)
for any i. Thus, it holds that Py,i = 1− qy and Py = (1− qy)k ,
where k is the length of the key.
Thus, the probability Qy of not finding the key after y
collisions is equivalent to the probability of not finding one bit
3In the Swiss-Knife protocol, it is obvious that the length of the challenge
is the same as the length of the key, thus i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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of the key and, thus, equivalent to the probability of not finding
bit i for some i. It holds
Qy = P
(
k⋃
i=1
{∀ ≤ Lt,i = 0} | y = Lt
)
= 1 − (1 − qy)k
≤
k∑
i=1
P(∀ ≤ Lt,i = 0 | y = Lt) = kqy, (8)
via the union bound. Thus,
Py = 1 − Qy ≥ 1 − kqy. (9)
We use Zt to denote the event {∀i, ∃ ≤ Lt : i = 1}
(of finding the key after at most t sessions) and Z′t the
complementary event {∃i : ∀ ≤ Lt : i = 0}. Then, for
any y ∈ N,
P(Zt ) ≥ P[Zt ∧ Lt > y] =
∑
z>y
P[Zt ∧ Lt = z] (10)
≥
∑
z>y
(1 − kqz)P[Lt = z] (11)
= P[Lt > y] − k
∑
z>y
qz P[Lt = z] (12)
≥ P[Lt > y] − kqy+1 11 − q (13)
= 1 − kq
1 − q q
y − P[Lt ≤ y]. (14)
From Lemma A.1 in Appendix 1, we get
P(Lt ≤ y) ≤ exp(−2α2t), (15)
where we set y to
y = ELt − αt, (16)
and α > 0.
Thus, the probability of successfully recovering the key after
at most t sessions is bounded by
P(Zt ) ≥ 1 − kq1 − q q
y − exp(−2α2t). (17)
But, according to [22, Theorem 5.15],
ELt = t − d + d
(
1 − 1
d
)t
. (18)
From Lemma A.2 in Appendix 1, we get
ELt ≥ t (t − 1)2ed , (19)
where e is the base of the natural algorithm and d ≥ 2. For
α = βt/2ed with β < 1, Equation (17) gives us
P(Zt ) ≥ 1 − kq1 − q exp
(
((1 − β)t2 − t) ln q
2ed
)
− exp
(
−2β
2t3
4e2d2
)
.
By choosing β = 12 , we obtain
P(Zt ) ≥ 1 − kq1 − q exp
(
(t2 − 2t) ln q
4ed
)
− exp
(
− t
3
8e2d2
)
.
(20)
Now note that, in order to have
kq
1 − q exp
(
(t2 − 2t) ln q
4ed
)
≤ δ1, exp
(
− t
3
8e2d2
)
≤ δ2,
(21)
for some δ1, δ2 ∈ [0, 1], it is sufficient for t to be
t ≥ 1 +
√
4ed log1/q
(
kq
δ1(1 − q)
)
+ 1, (22)
t ≥ (2ed)2/3(2 ln(1/δ2))1/3. (23)
Now let us set δ1 = δ2 = δ/2. By substituting t = 1 +√
4ed log1/q (2kq/δ(1 − q)) + 1 in the first exponential term
of Equation (20) and t = (2ed)2/3(2 ln(2/δ))1/3 in the second
exponential term, we obtain
P(Zt ) ≥ 1 − δ. (24)
Theorem 4.1. implies that the attack’s success probability
depends mostly on the length of the nonce. On the other
hand, it only very weakly depends on the length of the key.
Consequently, the protocols in this family are inherently weak
if nonces are short. Since the protocols under consideration
use single-bit challenges for each round, the worst case value
for q is 12 .
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we experimentally estimate the number of
sessions that need to be eavesdropped for a successful full
disclosure of the secret key in the Swiss-Knife [10] protocol.
A similar approach could be followed for the other three
protocols [7–9].
We start by considering the simple scenario in which there
are no transmission errors in the channel. Then, we adopt a
more realistic approach and consider that transmission errors
can occur both in the backward (tag-to-reader) and in the
forward channel (reader-to-tag). In both cases, we follow the
approach described in the previous section. All simulations
report averages over 214 runs.
5.1. Ideal communication channel
In these experiments, we examined the case when there are no
transmission errors in the channel. Initially, we investigated the
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FIGURE 2. Expected number of required sessions for ideal
communication channel (BER = 0.0) for various nonce lengths m
as the number of rounds n and the key length k = n increase. Note that
the number of sessions is scaled down by 10 and 100 for m = 16 and
m = 24, respectively.
attacker’s success probability when the number of nonces d
was kept fixed and the key length k and number of rounds n,
which are equal in this protocol family, increase. In particular,
we varied the nonce length m ∈ {8, 16, 24} and set d = 2n and
k = n. The results are presented in Fig. 2. Note that the number
of sessions is scaled by dividing by 1 (m = 8), 10 (m = 16)
and 100 (m = 24). While the number of eavesdropped sessions
increases when n, k rise, this effect is insignificant, as the theory
predicted. The greatest effect is due to the length of the nonce.
For this reason, in the remaining experiments, we set all the
variables in the protocol to the same bit length (i.e. |NP| =
|NV| = |x| = n). In particular, Fig. 3 shows the number of
sessions required to recover the session key for an ideal channel
under an increasing bit length. It is obvious that the expected
number of required sessions rises exponentially with the bit
length.
5.2. Noisy communication channel
In this section, we consider that errors may appear in the
communication due to noise. More precisely, we assume an
independent, symmetric noise model for both forward and
backward channels. In fact, we assume that both channels have
error rate ω. We use the results of the second experiment from
the previous section as follows. We vary n and set d = 2n and
k = n and, for each n, the attacker eavesdrops on a number
of sessions equal to the expected number of sessions required
to obtain the key in Fig. 3. Owing to the noise in the channel
some of the disclosed bits may be incorrect. In our experiments,
if one or more bits of the key are incorrect, we count it as an
unsuccessful attack and only when the whole key is revealed, a
success is scored. Figure 4 depicts the results of our simulations.
We can observe that the probability of success is over 80% when
FIGURE 3. Expected number of required sessions for a successful
attack in the ideal communication channel (BER = 0.0) as n increases
with k = n, d = 2n.
FIGURE 4. Adversary’s success probability for noisy communication
channel and four values of the BER as n increases, with k = n, d = 2n.
the bit error rate (BER)4 is 10−3. On the contrary, when the BER
is higher (BER = 0.015), the probability of success declines
exponentially as we increase the number of bits transmitted
during the RBE phase.
To improve upon the results of Fig. 4, the attacker has to
eavesdrop on a number of sessions greater than the sessions
required for the case where the communication channel is noise
free. In our experiments, we consider the probability of partial
4We should note here that the BER rates that are usually experienced in
RFID tags vary from 10−1 to 10−4 [23], while the BER rates that are usually
experienced by an RFID reader vary from 10−1 to 10−6 [24].
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FIGURE 5. Expected number of eavesdropped sessions required for noisy communication channel with k = n, d = 2n as the BER varies. The
left and right panels show the result for success probability P = 1 and P = 0.9, respectively.
success P , which denotes the percentage of bits of the total
key length that is disclosed. Then, for a partial success P , an
average of np bits are disclosed. For different values of P,
we estimate the expected number of sessions required. We
follow the algorithm described in Section 3. Nevertheless, we
performed a small modification in this algorithm to reduce the
required number of sessions. Let us assume that an invocation
of the mentioned algorithm is represented as k(j) = call(S(j)),
where k(j) is the secret key obtained at the j th invocation. We
follow the algorithm described below:
(1) Execute the algorithm k(j) = call(S(j)).
(2) Derive the most common value of the keys obtained.
For i = 1, . . . , n do:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
If
∑
j
(k
(j)
i = 1) ≥
∑
j
(k
(j)
i = 0), then yi = 1,
else yi = 0,
where k(j)i and yi represent the ith bit of k(j) and y,
respectively.
(3) Check whether P ·n bits of the key are already disclosed
(i.e. d(k, x) ≤ P · n, where d denotes the Hamming
distance). If not, jump to Step (1).
We perform an analysis of the number of sessions required
under noisy conditions. As previously, we perform 214
independent trials to obtain an average value. Figures 4–6
summarize the results obtained. Figure 5 depicts the expected
number of sessions required for P = 1 and P = 0.9. By
comparing these results, we observe that the expected number
of sessions is increased by an order of magnitude when the
percentage of recovered bits of the key is increased from 90
to 100%. For P = 0.9, the influence of errors in the channel
is only slightly more noticeable when the BER is higher.
However, for P = 1, the effect of the BER is marked. As
expected, the required number of sessions increases when
the number of challenge–response bits transmitted during
the RBE phase rises and/or the noise (BER) in the channel
increases.
Figure 6 depicts the expected number of eavesdropped
required sessions for very noisy channels. Specifically, we show
how the required number of eavesdropped sessions changes
as the number of bits increases for different values of P
(P = {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}) and BER values (BER = 0.03 or
BER = 0.06). For a moderately higher BER = 0.03, there
is no significant difference between the required number of
sessions for recovering a part of the key (i.e. 60–70%) or almost
the whole key (i.e. 90%). On the other hand, this difference
is evident for higher BERs (i.e. 0.06 in Fig. 6). From these
figures, we conclude that when the BER is low, the additional
effort required to obtain a larger percentage of the key is small.
The effect of noise becomes clearer in Fig. 7, which shows the
number of required eavesdropped sessions to fully obtain the
key (P = 1), versus the number of bits in the RBE phase,
for three different BER values (BER = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09}).
As a rule of thumb, we observe that when the BER is twice
as much as was previously simulated, the expected number
of required sessions is multiplied at least by a factor of 3.
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8 A. Mitrokotsa et al.
FIGURE 6. Expected number of required eavesdropped sessions for noisy communication channel as the required success probability P varies.
The left and right panels show the result for BER = 0.03 and BER = 0.06, respectively, with k = n, d = 2n.
FIGURE 7. Expected number of required eavesdropped sessions
for a noisy communication channel (BER = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09}) with
k = n, d = 2n.
Nevertheless, even for BER = 0.03, the expected number of
required eavesdropped sessions is inferior to the number of
attempts that an adversary would need to perform a brute force
attack5 (i.e.  of Required Sessions/2n < 1).
5If the number of bits transmitted during the RBE phase is n, then the
attacker has to guess a word of n bits.
6. COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST THE ATTACK
A simple way to circumvent the attack would be to implement
the Hancke and Kuhn protocol [3]. However, that protocol does
not prevent terrorist fraud attacks. We urge the reader to consult
[25] in which secret-sharing schemes and terrorist frauds are
studied in detail. Instead, we propose a countermeasure which
could be easily applied to all four distance-bounding protocols
in this family [7–10]. Our countermeasure avoids terrorist fraud
attacks, and leaks very little information to a passive attacker.
The main idea is to force the attacker to use multiple collisions
of the same pair of nonces to obtain new information. In other
words, observing multiple, but distinct, pairs of nonces, does not
give any more information than observing only one collision.
The countermeasure is deployed in the initialization phase,
which is modified as follows:
(1) Again the verifier V chooses a random nonce NV and
transmits it to the prover P .
(2) The prover P generates the nonce NP and a random
number R and computes the temporary keys {a′, b′} as
described below:
a′‖b′ := fx(NV, NP, C),
where C denotes any extra but constant parameters.
Then, the prover P splits its permanent secret key x
into two shares by computing:{
Z0 := a′,
Z1 := b′,
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FIGURE 8. The general view of the distance-bounding protocols
proposed in [7–10] modified with the proposed countermeasure secure
against terrorist fraud attacks.
Additionally, the prover P calculates the value y :=
x ⊕ hR(a′, b′), where h is a universal hash function.
Finally, the prover P transmits the values of NP, R and
y to the verifier.
(3) The verifier receives NP, R and y and checks the
correctness of y. If y is not correct, the whole protocol
is aborted.
In Fig. 8 is depicted the general view of the distance
bounding-protocols [7–10] modified with the proposed
countermeasure. According to the Leftover Hash Lemma
(Lemma A.3 in Appendix 1), it holds that (hR(a′, b′), R) is
	-indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed bit string if
the following holds:
k ≤ H∞(a′, b′) − 2 log2
1
	
, (25)
where h denotes a universal hash function with range 2k and
H∞(a′, b′) denotes the min entropy of a′, b′ (i.e. the expected
number of bits in a′,b′ which remain unknown after running the
attack).
The calculation of y and its transmission from P to V adds
no extra security risk to the protocol. Additionally, the use of
a′, b′, y and R prevents the type of attack presented in [26,
Section 3.2] since the secret sharing is well designed.
In this case, an adversaryAmust know a′, b′,R and y in order
to complete the protocol with a legitimate verifierV (potentially
by colluding with a dishonest proverP in the initialization phase
and then by himself in the RBE phase). However, this knowledge
implies that A will also be able to calculate the shared secret key
x, which contradicts the definition of the terrorist fraud attack.
In the family of protocols, we have investigated [7–10], a
simple (disjoint) collision of the pair (NP, NV) (or just NP in
the case of the Swiss-Knife) reveals some bits of the key. In the
proposed countermeasure, this is not the case. Simple disjoint
collisions of pairs (NP, NV) reveal bits of different vectors a′, b′.
In order to recover all the bits of a′, b′ and thus the key x,
a sufficient number of multi-collisions (i.e. the same pair (NV,
NP) used in many eavesdropped successful runs of the protocol)
is required; this happens much more rarely than simple disjoint
collisions lt , which are sufficient for the disclosure of the key
in the original protocol family.
More precisely, an adversary A that eavesdrops on a
successful execution of the protocol may be able to disclose half
of the bits of (a′‖b′), since when ci = 0, it holds ri = a′i , and
when ci = 1, it holds ri = b′i . If 2n is the total length of (a′‖b′),
then after a protocol run, the min-entropy will be n. If a collision
appears in the used nonces (NP, NV), then the attacker may be
able to recover more bits (using an attack similar to the one
described in Section 3) and the min-entropy will become n/2.
From any two sessions where a collision appears the adversary
observes two pairs of values:
R, y = x ⊕ hR(a′, b′) and R∗, y∗ = x ⊕ hR∗(a′, b′).
Since (a′, b′) → (hR(a′, b′), hR∗(a′, b′)) is also universal, for
2k ≤ n
2
− 2 log2
1
	
, (26)
this is 	-indistinguishable from pure randomness (based on the
Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma A.3)). More generally, lt simple
collisions leak no more information. Full disclosure of the
key is significantly harder using this modification, since multi-
collisions are much rarer than the disjoint collisions exploited
in our proposed attack.
In particular, according to the Theorem 1.2 in Appendix 1,
if d denotes the possible pairs of nonces (NV, NP), then the
probability Pr of having an r-collision (i.e. the same nonce pair
(NV, NP) is used r times) after recording t sessions is bounded
as follows:
Pr ≤ 1
dr−1
(
t
r
)
≤
(
t · e
r · d
)r
· d, (27)
where the second inequality follows from a standard variant of
Stirling’s approximation of the binomial coefficient. Rewriting,
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we obtain that t ≥ (P 1/r/e)rd1−1/r . Thus, the complexity of
the attack is
t = 
(P 1/r rd1−1/r ). (28)
For r = 
(log n), Equation (28) gives us t ≈ 
(d), while
our attack is successful against the original protocol after t ≈
O(
√
d) based on Theorem 4.1 in Appendix 1.
While the number of roundsn can be different from the length
of the key k, they are nevertheless not completely independent.
More precisely, n should satisfy the condition
n ≥ 4k + 4 log2
1
	
,
due to Equation (26), when the key x has k bits. On the other
hand, we have security beyond the birthday barrier related to
the size of the nonce.
Note that a PRF assumption alone is not enough to guarantee
the security for this protocol, as shown in [27]. We may need
some extra techniques to prove security.
7. CONCLUSION
We have presented an attack on a family of distance-bounding
protocols, which relies on nonce repetition. We have provided
a high probability bound on the success of this attack, showing
that it depends mainly on the nonce length log2(d) and only
sub-logarithmically on the shared secret length k. In addition,
we have experimentally investigated the success probability
under noise-free and noisy conditions. This shows that the
attacker’s chances decrease as noise increases. Consequently,
our theoretical bound can be used by practitioners to
appropriately select their security parameters (i.e. the lengths
of the employed nonces and the secret key) depending on the
application scenario. In fact, k must be sufficiently high to
make brute-force attack impractical and d must be large enough
for our attack to have appropriately low success probability.
Finally, we have introduced a countermeasure, based upon
a modification of the initialization phase. This significantly
improves security, since the number of sessions required for
a successful attack with high probability is bounded below
by d, whereas only
√
d sessions were sufficient for the original
protocol.
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APPENDIX 1
Theorem A.1 (Azuma–Hoeffding inequality [28]). Let Vj be
a martingale difference sequence (with range gj ), with respect
to some sequence Xj . If St =∑nj=0 Vj , then, for any u > 0,
P(St ≥ u) ≤ exp
(
− 2u
2∑t
j=1 g2j
)
, (A.1)
P(St ≤ −u) ≤ exp
(
− 2u
2∑t
j=1 g2j
)
. (A.2)
LemmaA.1. If Lt denotes the number of disjoint collisions for
a sequence xt  x1, . . . xt with xt ∈ X and xt ∼ Unif (X),
where |X| = d < ∞, then
P(Lt ≤ ELt − αt) ≤ exp(−2α2t), (A.3)
where α > 0 and t denotes the number of sessions we have
recorded.
Proof. Let
Pt  P(Lt+1 = Lt + 1 | xt ) where xt  x1, . . . , xt . (A.4)
Then
E(Lt+1 | xt ) = Lt + Pt , (A.5)
and since Lt , Pt depend only on xt , by defining
Vt+1  Lt+1 − (Lt + Pt), (A.6)
we obtain that Vt is a martingale difference sequence with
respect to xt since
E(Vt+1 | xt ) = 0. (A.7)
It holds that
St =
t∑
j=1
Vj = Lt −
t−1∑
j=1
Pj = Lt − ELt, (A.8)
which follows since Pt is the probability that we have a new
collision after the session t .
Consequently, the rightmost sum is equal to the expected
number of collisions until the session t . By applying Theorem
A.1 (Azuma–Hoeffding inequality), we have
P(St ≤ −u) = P(Lt ≤ ELt − u) ≤ exp
(
−2u
2
t
)
, (A.9)
where u > 0.
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In our case |Vj | ≤ 1, so gj = 1 for all j . If we set u = αt
where α > 0, then we get
P(St ≤ −u) = P(Lt ≤ ELt − αt) ≤ exp(−2α2t), (A.10)
where α > 0.
Lemma A.2. For any d ≥ 2, it holds that
t − d + d
(
1 − 1
d
)t
≥ t (t − 1)
2ed
, (A.11)
where e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Proof. Let us set
f (t) = t − d + d
(
1 − 1
d
)t
(A.12)
and
g(t) = t (t − 1)
cd
. (A.13)
We want to find c such that f (t) ≥ g(t).
The first partial derivatives of f and g with respect to t are
correspondingly
f ′(t) = 1 + d(1 − 1/d)t ln(1 − 1/d), g′(t) = 2t − 1
cd
.
(A.14)
In order to havef (t) ≥ g(t), it is sufficient to havef ′(t) ≥ g′(t)
and f (1) ≥ g(1) ∀t ∈ [1, d].
For t = 1, we have f (1) = g(1) = 0.
In order to have f ′(t) ≥ g′(t), it is sufficient to have
f ′′(t) ≥ g′′(t) and f ′(1) ≥ g′(1) ∀t ∈ [1, d].
The second partial derivatives of f and g with respect to t are
correspondingly
f ′′(t) = d(1 − 1/d)t [ln(1 − 1/d)]2, g′′(t) = 2
cd
. (A.15)
In order to have f ′′(t) ≥ g′′(t), we should have
c ≥ 2
d2(1 − 1/d)t ln2 (1 − 1/d)  σ(t). (A.16)
It is easy to see that σ(t) is monotonic and increasing
since σ ′(t) > 0, ∀t ∈ [1, d]. Thus, we should have
c ≥ maxt∈[1,d] σ(t) = P(d), where
P(d) = 2
d2(1 − 1/d)d ln2 (1 − 1/d) . (A.17)
It is easy to show that P(d) is also monotonic and increasing
and that P ′(d) > 0. We have
c ≥ sup
d≥1
P(d) = lim
d→∞
2
d2(1 − 1/d)d ln2 (1 − 1/d) = 2e.
(A.18)
Thus, it holds that f ′′(t) ≥ g′′(t) whenever c ≥ 2e.
In order to have f ′(1) ≥ g′(1), we should have
c ≥ 1
d + (d2 − d) ln (1 − 1/d) . (A.19)
If we set
h(d) = 1
d + (d2 − d) ln (1 − 1/d) , (A.20)
it is easy to show that h(d) is monotonic and increasing for
d ≥ 2 and that h′(d) > 0. Thus, we conclude that f (t) > g(t)
when c ≥ 2e and d ≥ 2.
Lemma A.3 (Impagliazzo–Levin–Luby [29]). If m ≤
H∞(X) − 2 log2(1/	) and h is a universal hash function
with a range of size 2m, then (hN(X),N) and (U,N)
have distributions which are 	-indistinguishable, where X,
N , U are independent and N and U are uniformly
distributed.
Theorem 1.2 [30]. If d denotes the number of possible nonces
and t the number of recorded sessions, then the probability to
have an r-collision is bounded by
P
r
≤ 1
dr−1
(
t
r
)
. (21)
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